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Heeding "The Best of Prophets": Historical Perspective and
Potential Reform of Public Sector Collective Bargaining in
Indiana
TODD C. DVORAK
"The best of Prophets of the future is the Past."
-Lord Byron'
INTRODUCTION
On December 11, 2008, Indiana Governor Mitch Daniels sent a letter to state
employees. He thanked them for their hard work in helping to make Indiana "strong
and solvent," but informed them they would see no pay raises in 2009.2 Later that day,
the Governor publicly warned that this move was "only the first and hardly the last of
[his] hard decisions" that might affect state employees: Conceding that workers would
be "disappointed by these actions," the Governor boasted that the state's $1.4 billion
surplus would remain "untouched." 4 Governor Daniels knew that the employees could
do little to oppose him. He knew this because he stripped them of their collective
bargaining rights when he entered office in 2005.5
This Note explores how Indiana labor relations reached this low point and offers
guidance about how to move forward. It argues that collective bargaining is in the best
interest of both public employees and the state. It acknowledges the political
complexities inherent in public-sector labor relations. This issue has significant
implications for the thousands of Hoosiers working for their government and the
millions more who make up the taxpaying public. 6 Their interests demand reform.
To map the road ahead, reformers must study the paths already traveled. A
significant portion of this Note is thus devoted to providing necessary political,
historical, and economic context. After Part I addresses the unique nature of collective
bargaining in the public sector, the focus shifts to an examination of the historical
events that determined public workers' bargaining rights. Part II provides an overview
* J.D. Candidate 2010, Indiana University Maurer School of Law - Bloomington; B.A.
History 2000, University of Notre Dame. I would like to thank Professor Kenneth Dau-Schmidt
for introducing me to the field of labor law. I would also like to thank my former colleagues at
the State College Friends School for helping me to see the dignity in workers' voices, and my
wife, Sarah, for helping me to find my own voice.
1. 8 George Gordon Byron, Ravenna Journal: January 28th, 1821, in 'BORN FOR
OPPOSITION': BYRON'S LETTERS AND JOuRNALs 37 (Leslie A. Marchand ed., 1978).
2. Letter from Mitch E. Daniels, Jr., Governor, State of Indiana, to State Employees
[hereinafter Daniels's Letter] (Dec. 11, 2008) (on file with the Indiana Law Journal).
3. Mary Beth Schneider, Daniels Seeks to Freeze State Workers' Pay, INDYSTAR.COM,
Dec. 11, 2008, http://www.indystar.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=-200881211044.
4. Mary Beth Schneider, Forecast Grim for Indiana, IND. STAR, Dec. 12, 2008, at Al.
5. See infra Part II.E.I.
6. Vijay Kapoor, Public Sector Labor Relations: Why it Should Matter to the Public and
to Academia, 5 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 401, 401 (2003) ("No topic has more importance for
millions of people yet has recently received such short shrift by academia than public sector
labor law.").
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of similar developments in Indiana, with an eye to the national context. Finally, Part III
applies lessons from history to the current situation of public employees in Indiana in a
call for legislative and political reform.
I. PUBLIC SECTOR V. PRIVATE SECTOR: A CRITICAL DIFFERENCE?
Collective bargaining rights encompass (1) the right of employees to organize in
appropriate bargaining units and select exclusive bargaining representatives, and (2)
the obligation of employers to bargain with employees' exclusive representatives over
designated subjects (e.g., salary, hours, and working conditions).
Opponents of collective bargaining attempt to highlight differences between public
and private employment to justify limits on public workers' rights.7 They argue that,
due to these differences, private sector rights should not be available to public workers.
These arguments have taken many forms over the years in legislatures, courthouses,
and public debates.
On the whole, however, any differences relevant to collective bargaining are
immaterial and artificial.8 Arguments relying upon them often seem antiquated or
overblown. The following discussion exposes the weaknesses of the most persistent of
these arguments, and aims to dispense with the theoretical obstacles to securing
collective bargaining rights for public employees.
A. State Sovereignty
One traditional obstacle for workers has been the state-sovereignty doctrine. This
doctrine derives from the "old English common law notion that the 'king can do no
wrong,"' and implies that public employees are "servants of the sovereign" who owe
"extra loyalty" to their employer.9 Opponents of public-employee collective bargaining
rights assert that the "traditional American notion of governmental supremacy" rejects
any requirement that the government bargain with its servants.'
0
7. One difference concerns function. Private employers generally focus on profit, but the
mission of public employers "is to provide a service deemed sufficiently important to have it
provided by a branch of government." JOSEPH R. GRODIN, JUNE M. WEISBERGER & MARTIN H.
MALIN, PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 1 (2004). Another difference
concerns employment conditions. "[M]any more terms and conditions of employment in the
public sector are set by statute." Id. Market forces largely shape terms and conditions in the
private sector, but public sector terms and conditions are matters of public policy determined by
"governmental officials and shaped by political processes." Clyde Summers, Public Sector
Bargaining. A Different Animal, 5 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 441,441-43 (2003).
8. The current status of public workers is the result of affirnative steps taken by
legislators, executives, and judges. See JOSEPH SLATER, PUBLIC WORKERS: GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEE UNIONS, THE LAW, AND THE STATE, 1900-1962, at 2 (2004) (describing the
"distinctions between all government and all private employees in U.S. law and policy [as]
neither natural nor inevitable").
9. Stephen F. Befort, Public Sector Bargaining: Fiscal Crisis and Unilateral Change, 69
MINN. L. REV. 1221, 1232 (1985).
10. Kapoor, supra note 6, at 402-03.
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This view dominated the early days of public-sector labor relations, but has largely
been discredited as "archaic and unworkable."" The expansion of government's role
throughout the twentieth century "produced basic changes in thought[,] which make the
foundations of any absolute notions of sovereignty obsolete."' 12 Democratically elected
officials are not infallible, and they serve at the will of the voters. Furthermore, their
decisions often yield the best results when the decision-making process is open to input
from various parties with conflicting interests.
B. Nondelegation
Another obstacle for workers comes from the idea that the government is prohibited
from delegating authority "properly within its legislative discretion" to private
parties.'3 Nondelegation theorists argue that, because legislative bodies retain the sole
authority to allot government expenditures, bargaining representatives--even
governors and mayors-should not be able to take this power away from them.14 Public
sector collective bargaining agreements are seen as more than mere contracts,'
5
because they are "inherently political" and deal with "[d]ecisions to reallocate
individual income and redistribute government benefits."'
' 6
This theory may appear sound, but only when detached from reality. The actual
experience of modem government runs counter to its hypothesis in two primary ways.
First, governmental officials involved in bargaining or approving other agreements
often retain "significant discretion. ' 7 Most government contracts require the approval
of legislative bodies, which means that public sector "negotiators [almost] never have
authority to make binding commitments."' 8 Second, because governments already
frequently enter into agreements with private business contractors, this theory is "at
best self-serving and at worst hypocritical."' 19
11. Befort, supra note 9, at 1233.
12. Harry T. Edwards, The Developing Labor Relations Law in the Public Sector, 10 DUQ.
L. REv. 357, 360-61 (1972) (arguing that the vague and conclusory nature of the state
sovereignty doctrine reveals it to be "clearly a vestige from another era," which "is hardly a
viable alternative in our modem society").
13. Befort, supra note 9, at 1232.
14. See Summers, supra note 7, at 443.
15. See id. at 442.
16. Mary Volk Gregory, Proposed Public Sector Bargaining Legislation for Colorado, 51
U. COLO. L. REv. 107, 127 (1979); see also GRoDIN ET AL., supra note 7, at 18-19 ("Even basic
issues, such as wages and fringe benefits, involve the allocation of scarce public resources and
can affect tax rates and user fees.").
17. SLATER, supra note 8, at 79-80 ("One could easily distinguish such grants of complete
discretion to private bodies from collective bargaining in the public sector, which involves
compromises between the employer and the union, or from arbitration, which involves enforcing
provisions in a collective agreement to which the government employer had already agreed."
(emphasis in original)).
18. GRODIN ET AL., supra note 7, at 2 (adding that some legislative bodies may themselves
lack the authority to enter into agreements if issues of nondelegation are involved).
19. SLATER, supra note 8, at 80 ("[S]tate and local governments 'have for over two
centuries negotiated contracts with private sector entities without the express permission of the
electorate."' (quoting 1 JoHN McBRIDE, THoMAs TouHEY & BARBARA McBRIDE, GovERNMENT
2010]
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C. Political Process
The political process-theory is directly tied to the issue of government delegation.
Opponents of workers' rights fear that public-sector collective bargaining "might skew
the democratic process by giving public sector unions an inordinate degree ofpower in
comparison with other interest groups.",20 They fear the political process will be
"significantly change[d] ... [by] removing subjects of bargaining from effective public
discussion. '"21
This fear is exaggerated.22 Public-employee unions "are no more threatening than
other organized interest groups having multiple means of influencing political decision-
making and perhaps are even relatively powerless in comparison to such groups.
23
Collective bargaining does not stifle public input that comes "through lobbying,
political action committees, and elections." 24 Furthermore, union influence is often
limited by structural checks like legislation25 or ratification requirements. 6
D. Divided Loyalty
A final theoretical obstacle to public-sector collective bargaining arises from the
notion that government employees must maintain allegiance to the state, and that
membership in a labor organization-whose interests may run counter to those of the
government--conflicts with this allegiance. This divided-loyalty theory is best
illustrated by examining the role of strikes.
While the right to strike is "fundamental" to private-sector employees,2 7 a strike by
public employees "is sometimes characterized as a challenge to a state's sovereignty,
CONTRACTS: LAW, ADMISTRATION, PROCEDURE (1984)).
20. Befort, supra note 9, at 1234-35; see also GRODIN ETAL., supra note 7, at 19 (stating
that the fear of antidemocratic processes exists because bargaining "provides one interest group,
the employees' union, with an avenue of access to the public decision making process that all
other interest groups lack"); Gregory, supra note 16, at 113 ("Granting bargaining rights to
public employees was said to redistribute political power by providing employees with two
points of access to the decision-making process: the ballot box and the bargaining table. This
gave them too much influence and disturbed the traditional balance of power.").
21. Summers, supra note 7, at 447.
22. See, e.g., Befort, supra note 9, at 1256.
23. Gregory, supra note 16, at 113; see also Summers, supra note 7, at 447 (arguing that
this influence is "not necessarily bad," because the unions "need the advantages they gain
through collective bargaining to offset the voters' effective voice in determining the budget and
taxes").
24. Befort, supra note 9, at 1261-62 (adding that, "[i]n the absence of collective
bargaining, public officials do not hold a referendum on each issue they confront").
25. See id at 1256. "Political process considerations sometimes are embodied in statutes
that either reserve certain matters for management determination or restrict mandatory
bargaining to certain enumerated items." Id.; see, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3523 (West 1995 &
Supp. 2009); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 286.011 (West 2008); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.70(4) (West
2007).
26. Gregory, supra note 16, at 128. Many agreements are not "final until ratified by the...
legislative body. If the terms and issues are made public prior to the ratification vote but after
the negotiation process has drawn to a close, there is ample opportunity for citizen input." Id.
27. Summers, supra note 7, at 450 ("While it may be limited in time, place, manner, and
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bordering on jnsurrectjon."2 9 Some fear that chaos and government paralysis will result
ifpublic workers walk offthe job.29 While this fear has been occasionally validated by
past experiences with police and firefighters, "for most public employee strikes, the
fear of paralysis or chaos is much greater than the pain of the reality." 30 In short, this
concern-like the previous obstacles-may be overblown, and the trend of recent
legislation may be quieting the fears.
31
The trauma of past public employee strikes is nonetheless deeply ingrained into the
collective conscience of government officials and the public. The Boston police strike
of 1919 is a frequently cited catastrophe that "opponents of public sector unions would
invoke.., as a cautionary tale of the evils of such unions." 32 The dispute arose because
police officers wanted better wages, reasonable working hours, and healthy working
conditions; tensions escalated quickly.33 When the Boston police commissioner
forbade officers from joining a union and then suspended nineteen officers for
violating this policy, the officers struck.34 The ensuing mayhem led to looting and
violence, with hundreds of citizens injured and nine killed. 35
Such scenes are atypical, especially where employees have recourse to structural
mechanisms like collective bargaining to channel their complaints. Contrary to critics'
warnings, "[t]he collective bargaining process itself tends to eliminate strikes because
it promotes compromise, brings a sense of responsibility to the unions, improves wages
and working conditions by equalizing bargaining power, and delineates employers' and
employees' rights and obligations."36 When Wisconsin public workers fought for
purpose, a broad prohibition of the right to strike would be politically rejected, if not considered
unconstitutional.").
28. Id. ("In the public sector, the starting assumption is ... that public employees have no
right to strike .... Employee recourse is solely through the political process where their
demands for higher pay are pitted against the voters' resistance to increased taxes.").
29. See id. at 451. This fear is evidenced by the prohibition on public employee strikes in
many states that provide statutory protection of collective bargaining rights. See, e.g., Martin H.
Malin, Public Employees'Right to Strike: Law and Experience, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 313
(1993).
30. Summers, supra note 7, at 451. "[U]nlike private sector strikes, they do not cut off the
income of the employer. The [government] continues to collect taxes, even though it is not
providing services or paying wages and salaries." Id.
31. See Malin, supra note 29, at 313. "Two of the three most recent jurisdictions to adopt
comprehensive public employee collective bargaining statutes, Illinois and Ohio, have granted
public employees the right to strike."Id. Notably, Ohio's statute was passed not long after
Toledo faced the chaos of a public-safety workers' strike that wreaked havoc on the city's
services and residents. See Andrew Douglas, Public Sector Employee Bargaining: Contract
Negotiations and Case Law, 55 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 1, 2-3 (2007).
32. SLATER, supra note 8, at 14.
33. See id. at26.
34. See id.
35. See id. at 27.
36. Gregory, supra note 16, at 107-08; see also IND. CODE ANN. § 20-29-1-1(2) (West
2008) ("Recognition by school employers of the right of school employees to organize and
acceptance of the principle and procedure of collective bargaining between school employers
and school employee organizations can alleviate various forms of strife and unrest."); Edward L.
Suntrup, Enabling Legislation for Collective Action by Public Employees and the Veto of
Indiana House Bill 1053, 9 Ind. L. Rev. 994, 1007 (1976) ("[T]he peaceful implementation of
the [collective bargaining] process is immensely enhanced by statutory protection.").
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collective bargaining rights, "the risk of strikes in the public sector came from refusing
to recognize unions, not from bargaining.,
37
Despite the strength of the arguments aimed at tearing down the theoretical
obstacles to public employee collective bargaining, political realities can still stand in
the way. The chaos in Boston served as a constant reminder of how "dangerous and
destructive, 38 public sector unions could be and "significantly postponed this coming
of the better day for public sector unions."
39
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF INDIANA PUBLIC SECTOR LABOR RELATIONS
Theory provides fodder for rhetoric, but history is the better guide to understanding
the rights of public workers. Because the legal progress of labor relations is
inextricably linked with the political, economic, and social history in which it develops,
this Part provides a contextual background to public-sector labor relations in Indiana.
A. The Background Story: The National Public Workers' Movement
Though meaningful developments did not begin in Indiana until the 1970s, the story
of public workers' rights in other states and at the national level is relevant to
understanding Indiana's progress.
The World War I era signaled the "false dawn ofpublic sector organizing. ' 4 0 As the
size and scope of the federal government expanded, legislators and public workers
seized the opportunity to fight for bargaining rights.4 ' The events in Boston in 1919,42
however, cut short this progress.43 The legal and political fallout from the Boston
police strike "lingered for decades," and was partly responsible for depriving public
employees of the rights gained by their private counterparts in the 1930s under the
National Labor Relations Act.44 Without this statutory protection, public workers
confronted hostility in the courts,45 mistrust in state legislatures, 46 and almost
indifference from organized labor.47
37. SLATER, supra note 8, at 164.
38. Id. at 14.
39. Id. at 35. The Boston strike "contributed far more than any other single event to the
peculiarly American view that public sector labor relations were something entirely distinct from
private sector labor relations." Id. at 14.
40. Id at 36.
41. In 1912, Congress passed the Lloyd-LaFollete Act,granting federal employees the right
to organize. Ch. 389, § 6, 37 Stat. 555 (1912). Post Office Clerks organized later that same year,
the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) formed in 1916, the National Association of Letter
Carriers and the Railway Mail Carriers formed in 1917, and the International Association of Fire
Fighters formed in 1918. All were affiliated with the American Federation of Labor (AFL). See
SLATER, supra note 8, at 17-19.
42. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
43. See SLATER, supra note 8, at 36 ("[T]he rapid rate of unionization in the public sector..
stagnated.").
44. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (2006); GRODIN ETAL., supra note 7, at 5.
45. SLATER, supra note 8, at 72-73 ("[S]tate courts controlled most labor relations in state
and local government employment for at least thirty years after the NLRA set federal statutory
rules for private employment .... In the public sector through at least the late 1950s, judges
(Vol. 85:701
HEEDING "THE BEST OF PROPHETS"
Deprived "of the standard weapons of labor," workers employed political tactics.48
The expansion of public sector employment in the 1960s coincided with shifts in
population demographics and public attitudes about governance that favored
government-worker unions.49 Public workers capitalized on the popularity of political
pluralism, which "stressed that democracy functioned best when government facilitated
resolutions of the interests of competing groups, including unions."50 These efforts led
to "an explosion of growth in public sector unionism."5' State governments began
showing a willingness to "rethink their approaches to collective bargaining."
52
Developments at the federal level mirrored this changing view of labor relations.
5 3
As union ranks swelled, public workers exercised political muscle by demanding
bargaining rights.54 The first major battleground came in Wisconsin. The Wisconsin
Federation of Labor "passed a resolution pledging to 'exert constant efforts' to enact
laws to rectify the 'discriminatory, unfair, and un-American' legal status of public
workers." 55 Claiming that "the only remedy . . .is a political one," Wisconsin's
across the nation were unwilling to permit government employees to bargain or to strike, and
courts routinely upheld bars on their organizing."). This hostility was justified by judges who
were "quick to apply the anti-union doctrines and rhetoric" of nondelegation, political process,
and divided loyalty. Id.; see also supra Part I; cf Ry. Mail Ass'n v. Murphy, 44 N.Y.S.2d 601
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1943) (warning that public sector unions "would inevitably lead to chaos,
dictators, and annihilation of representative government"), rev'd, Ry. Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 47
N.Y.S.2d 404 (N.Y. App. Div. 1944); Hutchinson v. Magee, 122 A. 234, 234 (Pa. 1923)
(describing public-sector unions as "subversive of the public service and detrimental to the
general welfare").
46. See SLATER, supra note 8, at 94 ("After World War II cities and states finally began to
pass laws which explicitly covered public sector unions, but these statutes were designed chiefly
to provide draconian penalties for government workers who struck.").
47. GRODIN ET AL., supra note 7, at 14 ("In contrast to the private sector, organized labor
did not view government workers as a particularly inviting target.").
48. SLATER, supra note 8, at 95-96.
49. See id. at 158-63; see also GRODIN ET AL., supra note 7, at 14.
50. SLATER, supra note 8, at 162.
51. GRODIN ET AL., supra note 7, at 3. The number of unionized state and local government
employees rose "from 3,560,000 workers in 1946 to 6,380,000 in 1962." SLATER, supra note 8,
at 162.
52. GRODIN ET AL., supra note 7, at 14.
53. "In 1962, President Kennedy issued Executive Order 10988, giving all federal
employees the right to join organizations of their choosing and to bargain collectively on non-
economic issues." Kapoor, supra note 6, at 403. President Lyndon B. Johnson's Great Society
programs increased federal funding for "public services in health, education and social
services." GRODIN ET AL., supra note 7, at 15. When Congress provided funds to local
governments to purchase private mass-transit systems through the Urban Mass Transit Act in
1964, it "required that the collective bargaining rights of transit employees be preserved." Id.
54. See SLATER, supra note 8, at 164-65 (The President of the American Federation of
State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) advocated "'a shift in emphasis,' ... to a
'clearly defined policy of gaining formal recognition and establishing . . . collective
bargaining."' (citation omitted)). The International Brotherhood of Teamsters, the Service
Employees International Union (SEIU), and the AFL-CIO also "aggressively organized public
employees" and developed similar political strategies. GRODIN ET AL., supra note 7, at 16.
55. SLATER, supra note 8, at 176-77.
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determined public workers helped to elect a Democratic governor and state assembly.56
The newly elected officials were sympathetic to the workers' cause, and enacted
legislation over the next several years that granted collective bargaining rights to state
and local government employees.
57
The impact ofthese laws was monumental. Public-sector labor relations entered an
"enlightened era.",5 8 The success in Wisconsin reignited the struggle for public-
workers' rights, both as "an opening salvo and a historic watershed in Wisconsin and
the nation., 59 Referring to Wisconsin's law as "the Magna Carta for public
employees," one labor leader claimed, "it meant as much as the NLRA did in private
industry., 60 As the momentum quickly spread to other states,6 1 public workers' union
membership and political influence skyrocketed.62 This "first crack" in the oppressive
legal structure was a milestone: it was "the end of the beginning for public sector
unions, and the start of an American labor movement increasingly composed of public
workers."
63
After two decades of statutory successes, public employees again faced staunch
opposition as the political pendulum swung back in the other direction. "[B]eginning
with President Ronald Reagan in the 1980s and continuing into the Republican
revolution of 1996, public outcries for smaller government and less aid to cities forced
[government officials] to reduce spending. Unions also began to take some of the
blame" for the financial crises that shook the economy.64 This antiunion political
sentiment still thrives in Indiana, where values of efficiency and privatization dominate
the rhetoric and policies of elected state officials.65
In 2009, public workers across the nation still largely depend upon specific
legislation granting bargaining rights.66 Most states grant these rights to at least some
56. Id. at 178-79. The workers and their unions also engaged in letter-writing and door-to-
door campaigns, through which "legislators at home on weekends were deluged with visits by
the local public employees." Id. at 182-83.
57. See id at 183-91.
58. Id. at 183.
59. Id. at 191.
60. Id. at 189 (referring to the President of the Wisconsin Council of County and Municipal
Employees) (internal quotation marks omitted).
61. See id. at 191 (Within one year, "sixteen states had enacted laws extending at least some
organizing and bargaining rights to at least some public employees.").
62. See GRODIN ETAL., supra note 7, at 3 (noting that AFSCME membership "quadrupled
in size in twenty years, growing from 254,000 members in 1965 to 1,005,000 members in
1985").
63. SLATER, supra note 8, at 158.
64. Kapoor, supra note 6, at 404.
65. One of the most highly publicized acts of privatization of state functions occurred in
2006, when the state leased the Indiana Toll Road to a private consortium. Tom Coyne, Indiana
Lawmakers at Odds Over Toll Road, WASH. POST.COM, June 27, 2007,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/27/AR2007062700395.html.
Though the plan for the seventy-five year, $3.8 billion lease was met with hostility across much
of the state, Governor Mitch Daniels justified it as a "great deal" for the state. Id
66. See Kapoor, supra note 6, at 404 ("[N]o constitutional right requires municipalities or
states to bargain" with employee unions.).
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of their employees.67 However, coverage is far from comprehensive. In the end, while
"[t]he law in the United States reflects a clear policy choice favoring public employee
collective bargaining," 69 the legal history and politics within each state is controlling.
Because public-sector labor relations are intimately tied to local political realities, any
state-level reform must be accompanied by analysis of that state's own labor history.
B. The Birth of the Indiana Movement: Victory and Setback in the 1970s
Indiana's public workers missed out on the progress of the 1960s. Prior to 1973, the
Indiana Code "dealt generally with the regulation of labor relations in Indiana, but did
not enable collective action" for public-sector employees. 70 The 1970s marked a new
era for public-sector collective bargaining in Indiana, and progress came in the form of
legislation.
The state legislature enacted Public Law 217 in 1973, granting collective bargaining
rights to public school teachers.71 Though not the end of the road in securing an equal
footing for public workers,72 it was definitely a step in the right direction.
In 1975, the General Assembly passed House Bill 1053, which intended to expand
public sector collective bargaining rights to police officers and firefighters.73 Although
Governor Otis Bowen vetoed the bill, his veto was more instructive than destructive.
Bowen complained of structural and wording problems in the bill but seemed fully in
favor of the spirit of the legislation.74 This was a subtle, yet significant, advancement of
67. Many states have comprehensive public-employee labor-relations statutes. See, e.g.,
CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 3500-3510 (West 2009); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 447.201-.609 (West 2008);
IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 20.1-31 (West 2008); N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW §§ 200-214 (McKinney
2008). Some others grant statutory bargaining rights to specific groups of employees. See, e.g.,
GA. CODE ANN. § 25-5-3 (West 2008) (firefighters); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 33-1271, 44-1802
(2008) (teachers and firefighters, respectively). A few states ban public-sector collective
bargaining entirely. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 95-98 (West 2008); Commonwealth v.
County Bd., 232 S.E.2d 30, 40 (Va. 1977); see also Malin, supra note 29, at 313 n.13.
68. While three of Indiana's neighbors-Illinois, Michigan, and Ohio--require the state to
bargain with almost all of their employees, see 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 315/1 to 315/27
(West 2008); MICH. COMp. LAws ANN. §§ 423.201-.216 (West 2008); OHmo REV. CODEANN. §§
4117.01-.24 (West 2008), another neighbor-Kentucky-requires bargaining only with
selected public-safety employees, Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 78.470,345.010-. 130 (West 2008)
(county police and firefighters, respectively).
69. Malin, supra note 29, at 313 n.13.
70. Suntrup, supra note 36, at 995.
71. IND. CODE §§ 20-7.5-1-1 to -14 (1973) (repealed 2005). Though the original statute was
replaced by IND. CODE §§ 20-29-1-1 to -5, it still protected the collective bargaining rights of
certified teachers working for public schools.
72. The law was not necessarily even the end of the road for teachers in securing
meaningful collective bargaining rights. See Lisa B. Bingham, Teacher Bargaining in Indiana:
The Courts and the Board on the Road Less Traveled, 27 IND. L. REv. 989, 1032 (1994)
(arguing, upon reflection of the law's twenty years in existence, that "a broader scope of
bargaining, combined with a brighter line as to managerial prerogative, might enhance labor
relations and serve the public interest").
73. See Suntrup, supra note 36, at 996.
74. SeeId. at 996-1000.
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the cause of Indiana's public workers. A Republican Governor not only showed
support for extending collective bargaining rights to state public-safety employees; he
assumed that Indiana's other public employees were entitled to these rights.75
Later that same year, the enactment of the Public Employee Labor Relations Act
(PELRA) embodied this sentiment.7 6 Like the landmark statute passed in Wisconsin a
decade earlier, PELRA ushered Indiana into the progressive column of government
employers who valued the rights of their employees. The Act required the state to
recognize and bargain with exclusive representatives of most of its employees." It also
directed the Educational Employment Relations Board (EERB)--established to
administer teacher collective bargaining--to administer public-sector labor relations by
determining the composition of bargaining units and adjudicating labor disputes.78
PELRA contained several other provisions, however, which would lead to the entire
Act's undoing. "Section 8(g) of the law authorized judicial review for any 'person
aggrieved' by any 'final order' of the EERB. Sections 8(d) and 8(i) of the statute,
however, specifically excluded from the court consideration or review of the EERB's
determination of employee organization majority in an appropriate unit., 79 This
provision meant that the determination and certification of a state employees'
organization as exclusive bargaining representative were expressly excluded from the
purview ofjudicial review.
The constitutionality of this aspect of PELRA came before the Indiana Supreme
Court in Indiana Educational Employment Relations Board v. Benton Community
School Corp.8 0 A school board contested the EERB's determination of an appropriate
bargaining unit for noncertified school employees. EERB argued that its preelection
determination was subject to judicial review, but the court disagreed.8 1 The court held
that the Act violated article 1, section 12, of the Indiana Constitution because it
precluded judicial review of EERB preelection decisions.8 2 Despite the limited scope
75. See id. at 996-97 n. 13 (quoting Message from the Governor, 1975 IND. HOUSE J. 103 1-
32). The Governor's message to legislators described the bill as "well-meaning but open-ended
legislation," adding that "[i]t is only fair that policemen and firemen be allowed to exercise
collective bargaining privileges as are granted to other public employees." Id.
76. IND. CODE § § 22-6-4-1 to - 13 (1975), invalidated by Ind. Educ. Employment Relations
Bd. v. Benton Cmty. Sch. Corp., 365 N.E.2d 752 (Ind. 1977).
77. The Act applied to all public employees, except policemen, firemen, professional
engineers, university faculty members, certificated employees of school corporations (who were
covered by Public Law 217), confidential employees, or municipal/county health-care institution
employees. Id. § 22-6-4-1(c).
78. See id.
79. Edward P. Archer, Labor Law: Survey ofRecent Developments in Indiana Law, 12 IND.
L. REv. 212, 212-13 (1979).
80. 365 N.E.2d 752 (Ind. 1977).
81. EERB's contention relied upon the applicability of the Indiana Administrative
Adjudication Act (IAAA), IND. CODE § 4-22-1-14 (1971), to it decisions, but the court "argued
that... such representation questions were not 'final' administrative orders as would be ripe for
review" under the IAAA. Archer, supra note 79, at 213. This reasoning was strengthened by the
fact that PELRA lacked a provision specifically allowing for appeals to be taken under the
IAAA, while Public Law 217 included such language. See Benton Cmty. Sch. Corp., 365 N.E.2d
at 758-59.
82. See Archer, supra note 79, at 212. The court was guided by its holding in Warren v.
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of PELRA's constitutional flaws, the court refused to sever the unconstitutional
provisions from the rest of the Act, because the provisions apparently were "so unique
and shape the fundamental character of Indiana's public employee bargaining
statute. 83 Therefore, the court voided the entire Act.
"The impact of this decision on collective bargaining for Indiana public employees
[wa]s, of course, devastating." 84 Workers, voters, organized labor, and elected officials
attempted to use the democratic process to usher in a new era of public sector labor
relations. Benton Community thwarted those attempts. The Indiana Supreme Court
erased PELRA from the books. Public employees were faced again with the reality of
employment without collective bargaining rights. They would live with this reality for
over another decade.
C. The Judiciary's Effect on Indiana Public Workers: Retrenchment in the 1980s
While legislative action dominated Indiana's progress in public-sector labor
relations in the 1970s, judicial action dominated its regress in the 1980s. Indiana state
court decisions after Benton Community signaled "a retrenchment from prior decisions
which permitted public employee bargaining even absent statutory authorization.
' 85
The courts acted by curtailing public employees' constitutional protections. In
County Department of Public Welfare v. American Federation of State, County and
Municipal Employees,86 the Indiana Court of Appeals for the Third District addressed
whether a county had to continue negotiations-which began before Benton
Community invalidated PELRA-with its employees' exclusive bargaining
8788
representative. Though the court based its decision upon the law of contract, 8 in
dicta it attacked the premise of a constitutional right to engage in collective
bargaining.8 9 Later that year, the same court explicitly addressed collective bargaining
Ind Telephone Co., 26 N.E.2d 399 (Ind. 1940). See Benton Cmty. Sch. Corp., 365 N.E.2d at
760.
83. Benton Cmty. Sch. Corp., 365 N.E.2d at 761. Justice De Bruler's dissent agreed that the
provisions were unconstitutional, but argued that they should have been severed from the
remainder of the Act. See id. at 762-63 (De Bruler, J., dissenting).
84. Archer, supra note 79, at 214.
85. Edward P. Archer, Labor Law: Survey ofRecent Developments in Indiana Law, 15 IND.
L. REv. 269, 280 (1982).
86. 416 N.E.2d 153 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).
87. Id.
88. See id. at 156 (holding that the prior agreement between the parties was "illusory and..
unenforceable," since it was "at most an agreement to make an agreement").
89. See id. at 155 ("The common law of this state does not, of course, grant to one group of
individuals the right to impose their will upon another group merely because the whole number
work for the same employer and the former group constitute something more than 50% of the
total.... Similarly, the notion that between employer and employee there should be not only the
right but a duty to bargain over the terms of employment is a creature of statute." (emphasis
omitted)). Despite the persuasive Indiana authority for the proposition that, even absent
statutory authority, a public employer may enter into a collective bargaining agreement
providing for exclusive representation of all employers by their majority representative, the
court found ways to distinguish this case from that precedent and struck another blow at public
workers' rights. Id. at 157-60 (Slaton, J., concurring).
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in Michigan City Area Schools v. Siddall.90 The court returned to the constitutional
question, highlighting the "critical" distinction between employees' constitutional right
to organize, and the lack of a constitutional duty on the employer to collectively
bargain. 91 The court held that a state does not engage in any "illegal interference...
where [it] does no more than refuse to recognize . . . some employee selected
organization or its agents." 92
Three primary lessons emerged from these cases. First, Indiana state employees
could join a union, but their employer did not have to recognize that union. Second,
state employees could engage in collective bargaining, but could not compel their
employer to bargain. Third, if the government voluntarily agreed to collective
bargaining, it could "impose qualifications and restrictions on its participation." 93 This
approach created a distorted view of collective bargaining rights. It also rendered the
prospect of bilateral labor agreements a distant dream. Though public workers retained
a constitutional right to join unions, they incurred "substantial difficulties.., without
the benefit of an authorizing statute." 94
Even when the government agreed to bargain with its employees, any subsequent
agreements were at risk of being voided by the judiciary. In Fort Wayne Patrolman's
Benevolent Ass 'n, Inc. v. City of Fort Wayne,95 the Fourth District Court of Appeals
voided an agreement between a Mayor and a police officers' union.96 Adhering to a
"very restrictive interpretation of the authority of public employers to bargain," 97 the
court declared the Mayor's actions a "usurpation of unwarranted power, not authorized
by the Common Council's resolution or any legislative enactment of the State of
Indiana."98 This decision sent a message to any party involved in public sector
collective bargaining that they "must be extremely careful to obtain approval of any
agreement reached from all governmental bodies which control the public employees
90. 427 N.E.2d 464 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).
91. Id. at 466-67 (referring implicitly to the voiding of PELRA, the court stated, "[i]f there
is no legal obligation statutorily or at common law to engage in good faith collective bargaining
• . . the employer has the same freedom of choice to deal with or reject dealing with a
'bargaining' agent").
92. Id. at 467 (emphasis omitted).
93. Edward P. Archer, Labor Law: Survey ofRecent Developments in Indiana Law, 16 IND.
L. Rzv. 225, 229 (1983). These lessons were confirmed by the Third District in City of
Michigan City v. Fraternal Order ofPolice, which held that "the law imposes no duty upon the
City to bargain collectively with its policemen or firemen, or to accredit (recognize) any
organization that wishes to serve as their spokesman." 505 N.E.2d 159, 160 (Ind. Ct. App.
1987).
94. Archer, supra note 85, at 279.
95. 408 N.E.2d 1295 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
96. Id.
97. Archer, supra note 85, at 280.
98. Fort Wayne Patrolman's Benevolent Ass "n, 408 N.E.2d at 1302 (The Mayor of Fort
Wayne recognized the Patrolman's Benevolent Association (PBA) as the exclusive bargaining
representative of the city's police officers. After the Fort Wayne Common Council resolved to
approve the Mayor's recognition, the Mayor entered into an agreement with PBA. Relying on a
state law that required any change in city employees' salaries to be "fixed by the mayor subject
to the approval of the common council," the court found that the Mayor had not received the
council's approval-despite the council's earlier resolution-to enter the agreement).
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covered by the agreement: executive, administrative, and perhaps even legislative."99
Overlapping state statutes and municipal ordinances, however, often makes it difficult
to determine the approval needed.100
This string of decisions led Professor Edward P. Archer to observe that, if these
cases "set the trend, the need for a public employees' bargaining bill is great if any
meaningful bargaining is to occur."'' The trend continued, and the years ticked by
without another statute. But as the 1980s came to a close, the political winds began
shifting again.
D. Indiana's Alternative Path: Executive Orders from 1990-2004
After over a decade of indifference, public-sector labor relations in Indiana returned
to the spotlight. 0 2 Indiana's first Democratic Governor in twenty years, Evan Bayh,
"pushed a legislative fix" to secure collective bargaining rights for the majority of the
state's workers'
0 3
Unfortunately for the workers, conditions in the economy were not ripe for such a
fix. 3 4 Furthermore, private-sector labor-management conflict was on the upswing
across the nation. 0 5 This made employers balk at the prospect of extending rights to
workers and voters less sympathetic to the workers' cause. "Ultimately . . . no
collective bargaining legislation passed ... "106
99. Archer, supra note 85, at 280.
100. Although Fort Wayne Patrolman's Benevolent Association concerned municipal
government, "[s]tructural problems are more complex on the state level than on the local level."
Befort, supra note 9, at 1242. "[C]ollective bargaining in the public sector requires an
accommodation between bargaining legislation and a host of other statutes that frequently are
not compatible with private sector notions of bargaining." Id. at 1235. Often,
"statutory provisions... provide for a diffused management structure in which multiple
officers or agencies share decision-making authority concerning public employee terms and
conditions of employment, causing confusion over which entity is the "public employer."
Id. at 1235. "[S]tatutes in the public sector frequently vest multiple agencies or officials
with shared responsibility over employment matters. Identifying the appropriate "public
employer" in this context is no easy task." Id. at 1236.
101. Archer, supra note 85, at 273.
102. During the 1990 legislative session, "the right of state and local government employees
to bargain collectively over the terms and conditions of their employment was the subject of
much legislative debate and media attention." Mitzi H. Martin & Todd M. Nierman, Survey of
Recent Developments in Indiana Employment Law, 24 IND. L. REV. 951, 967 (1991).
103. White House 2008-The Democrats Bayh: The New Labor Dem, HOTuNE, May 4,2006
[hereinafter New Labor Dem].
104. See William M. Davis, Collective Bargaining in 1990: Health Care Cost a Common
Issue, MONTHLY LABOR REvIEw, Jan. 1990, at 3, 3-5 ("As the 1980's [sic] drew to a close, signs
pointed to continuing but slower economic growth.... Meanwhile, the budget and trade deficits
were continuing major concerns ... [as well as] the steep rise in the cost of health benefits.").
105. See id. at 5 ("The general decline in labor-management conflict (as measured by work
stoppage activity) that prevailed in the 1980's [sic] suffered a setback as the decade closed.").
106. Martin & Nierman, supra note 102, at 967.
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Governor Bayh took an alternative route, which was similar to that taken by
President Kennedy in 1962.107 On July 1, 1990, "[o]ver the objection of [the] business
lobby, he signed an executive order granting 30,000 state employees collective
bargaining rights."' 0 8 Although this order fell short of the legislative goal workers
sought, it was a victory nonetheless. It also "sparked a massive union organizing drive
in 1990. " 1"9 Bayh directed a course for public-sector labor relations that respected
workers' rights without sacrificing fiscal responsibility or the interests of taxpayers. "
0
Contrary to the fears of critics, this new labor environment dramatically reduced
tensions.' This successful beginning laid the groundwork for fifteen years of
harmonious and cooperative relations between state employees and their employer.",
2
Success by executive order had one primary limitation: the continued existence of
collective bargaining rights hung in the balance with each gubernatorial election.'
13
Though the Indiana General Assembly repeatedly tried to pass legislation to avoid this
uncertainty, the Republican-controlled Senate-and sometimes House Republicans-
thwarted these efforts on every try.' '4 Despite the legislative failures, Bayh's
107. See Kapoor, supra note 6, at 403.
108. New Labor Dem, supra note 103; see also Ind. Exec. Order No. 90-6, 13 Ind. Reg. 10
(1990).
109. Kevin Corcoran, Daniels Leaves State-Union Bargaining in Doubt, IND. STAR, Jan. 11,
2005, at BO1. Organizing was dominated by three national labor organizations: the American
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), the United Auto Workers
(UAW), and the American Federation of Teachers (AFT). Over the next decade, these unions
came to "represent nearly two-thirds of the state's roughly 35,000 executive branch employees."
Id.
110. See Kevin Corcoran & Mary Beth Schneider, Daniels Ends Union Pacts for 25,000,
IND. STAR, Jan. 12, 2005, at AOl (In addition to negotiating for traditional matters like salary
and seniority, the unions "bargained for health care subsidies, handled workers' job-related
grievances and protected employees' rights during disciplinary hearings."); see also NewLabor
Dem, supra note 103 ("Bayh's team structured negotiations to make sure that taxpayers could
afford the bill," and established structural limitations on bargaining that prevented undue
influence by the labor unions .... Contracts couldn't be negotiated, for example, when the
legislature was in session and therefore [susceptible] to intense lobbying.").
11. See New Labor Dem, supra note 103.
112. The booming economy of the 1990s also likely played a role.
113. Corcoran & Schneider, supra note 110 ("Indiana is unusual among states because this
negotiating authority, not found in state law, had depended on each incoming governor signing a
new executive order.").
114. See Corcoran, supra note 109; see also H.R. 1176, 112th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ind.
2004) (extending collective bargaining rights to noncertificated school employees; made it out
of committee but did not pass House vote); H.R. 1337, 113th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ind.
2003) (extending collective bargaining rights to most state employees; made it out of committee
but did not pass House vote); H.R. 1220, 112th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2002) (extending
collective bargaining rights to most state employees; passed the House 55-42 but died in
committee in the Senate); H.R. 1540, 112th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2001) (extending
collective bargaining rights to most state employees; passed the House 56-40 but died in
committee in the Senate); H.R. 1332, 111 th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2000) (extending
collective bargaining rights to noncertificated school employees; passed the House 54-45 but
died in committee in the Senate); H.R. 1442, 111th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ind. 1999)
(extending collective bargaining rights to noncertificated school employees; passed the House
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Democratic successors-Frank O'Bannon and Joe Keman-continued his policy.'" 5
By 2004, almost 25,000 Indiana state employees were represented by organized
labor.'"
6
Republican Mitch Daniels challenged Governor Kernan in 2004. The challenger
offered voters his antiunion budget-slashing expertise gained as Director of the Office
of Management and Budget under President George W. Bush. 1 7 A self-styled
,,decider,,l18 Daniels took "cues on his leadership style" from mentors like President
Bush and claimed The Godfather"9 was "the best business textbook [he] ever read."'' 20
To some, he seemed fearless; to others, he was foolhardy.'12 Since the fate of Indiana's
public employees depended once again upon the outcome of an election, the public
employees' unions supported Kernan.' 22 When Daniels won, the unions' future-and
that of the workers they represented-looked grim.
E. Turning Back the Clock in Indiana: Rescission of Workers' Rights in 2005
The incoming Daniels' administration wasted no time in addressing public-
employee collective bargaining. The Governor's swift, unilateral actions stripped
unions of their political and economic power and left public workers at the mercy of
the administration's decisions regarding terms and conditions of employment.
1. Indiana Executive Order 05-14
On his second day in office, Governor Daniels signed Executive Order 05-14, which
impacted state workers in three primary ways. First, it rescinded Executive Orders 90-
6, 97-8, and 03-35,123 which effectively revoked the collective bargaining rights of
almost 25,000 state workers. 124 Second, it canceled existing contracts between the state
52-44 but died in committee in the Senate).
115. See Corcoran, supra note 109; see also Ind. Exec. Order No. 03-35, 27 Ind. Reg. 1007
(Oct. 1, 2003); Ind. Exec. Order No. 97-8, 20 Ind. Reg. 2222 (Oct. 1, 1997).
116. AFSCME Council 62 represented over 8500 hospital attendants, welfare caseworkers,
and professional health-care workers. The Unity Team (a coalition of UAW and AFT) Local
9212 represented over 14,600 employees, including mechanics and secretaries. The
International Union of Police Associations (IUPA) Local 1041 represented almost 1400 State
Police troopers, State Excise Police officers, and Department of Natural Resources conservation
officers. See Corcoran & Schneider, supra note 110.
117. See GRODIN ET AL., supra note 7, at 13-14 ("On January 7,2002, President George W.
Bush issued Executive Order 13252, which, on national security grounds, prohibited collective
bargaining by employees in five subdivisions of the Department of Justice ... ").
118. According to Daniels, "once a decision is made, he doesn't second-guess it. 'Take the
best available course and get on with it' ..... 'Success is for others to judge."' Mary Beth
Schneider, The First 100 Days in Office, IND. STAR, Apr. 19, 2005, at AO1.
119. MARio Puzo, THE GODFATHER (1969).
120. Schneider, supra note 118.
121. See Mike Smith, Fearless or Foolhardy? Verdict Out on Daniels, MERRILLVH.LE POST-
TRIB., Jan. 8, 2006, at A8.
122. See Corcoran, supra note 109.
123. Ind. Exec. Order 05-14, 28 Ind. Reg. 1904, 1905 (Jan. 1, 2005).
124. See Corcoran & Schneider, supra note 110. Most state employees lost the ability to
negotiate with the state, through an exclusive bargaining representative, for pay, benefits, work
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and state employees' unions, which were supposed to run through 2007.25 Third, the
order established a new employee complaint procedure, to be administered under the
State Employees Appeals Commission (SEAC).126 Although Daniels claimed "unions
can still have a role in the process,"' 127 the order left state employee unions virtually
ineffective.
28
Following through on a campaign promise to restructure government, Daniels began
his reforms by rescinding workers' rights. 29 In the words of the Governor, the state
employee collective bargaining system "only existed by fiat of former governors and
was 'absolutely inadequate for the challenges [Indiana] face[s]." '" 130
The talking points for the new leadership focused on efficiency, flexibility, and
control. Daniels envisioned that his structural "overhaul" would "'free government
from the paralysis ofthis [collective bargaining] system."' 131 The paralyzing aspect of
collective bargaining, according to the Governor, was "the way it really encumber[ed]
the ability of government to change.'' ' 32 Republican House Speaker Brian Bosma
stated Governor Daniels believed the Executive Order was "appropriate ... because it
freed [Daniels] to reform state government without union approval."', 33 According to
the State Director of Personnel, Daniels wanted to be able to move "nimbly and with
flexibility" in reshaping Indiana government.1
34
Behind the rhetoric lay the purpose of Executive Order 05-14: to silence the voice
of state employees, thereby freeing the Governor to act unilaterally in state personnel
decisions. Daniels' governing style required action and did not allow for the hassle of
rules, and seniority rights. Id.
125. See id. The order "rescinded and declared null and void" Executive Orders 03-44, 03-
45, 04-01, Ind. Exec. Order 05-14, 28 Ind. Reg. at 1905, all created by Governor Keman.
126. See id. The procedure allowed some state employees to "file a complaint concerning the
employee's dismissal, demotion, or suspension without pay," whereupon SEAC would
"determine whether the suspension, demotion, or dismissal was based on inadequate
performance or inappropriate behavior," and might reverse personnel decisions. Id. The
Governor appointed all five members of the SEAC, and previous appeals commissions had
upheld virtually all management decisions. Nonetheless, Daniels insisted that the procedure
would ensure "full protection of employees against any arbitrary or unfair actions." Corcoran &
Schneider, supra note 110. Daniels also claimed the "new arrangements [would] expand
workers' freedoms while better serving the public interest." Mike Smith, Daniels Rescinds
Orders Allowing for Collective Bargaining, EVANSVILLE COURIER, Jan. 12, 2005, at A8.
127. Niki Kelly, Workersfor State Non-Union Daniels Voids Collective Bargaining, J.-
GAZErE (Fort Wayne), Jan. 12, 2005. Daniels said that unions would be able to represent state
employees in a grievance procedure and would be able to meet and confer with the State
Personnel Department on a quarterly basis. Id.
128. See Corcoran & Schneider, supra note 110.
129. The text of the Order reads, "the State must move forward with meaningful reforms,
including improvements in the State's personnel system." Ind. Exec. Order 05-14, 28 Ind. Reg.
at 1905.
130. Kelly, supra note 127.
131. Chuck Jordan, Labor to Advance Bargaining Rightsfor State Employees, CONGRESS
DAILY, July 23, 2007, http://www.nationaljournal.com/congressdaily/arn 20070723-6.php.
132. Kelly, supra note 127.
133. Jim Stinson, Daniels: No More Work Rules Governor Terminates Bargaining Rightsfor
25,000 State Employees, MERRILLVILLE POsT-TRim., Jan. 12, 2005, at A1.
134. Ruth Holladay, Opinion Column, IND. STAR, Jan. 27, 2005.
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consulting with other interested parties.135 When he wanted to create the Family and
Social Services Administration (FSSA), Daniels wanted to do so "without having to
consult union officials" and saw the soon-to-be-rescinded union contracts as standing
in the way of his plans. 136 Even though "[h]alf of the 35,000 state executive branch
employees earn[ed] less than $29,738 a year,"' 37 the new administration viewed the
workers' collective economic and political influence as a threat.
Many Hoosiers were deeply troubled by Daniels' decision. The Governor "hope[d]
fervently" that all would "work out very, very well for every worker in government in
the state of Indiana."' 38 Employees may have shared his hope, but few approved of his
actions. 39 Democratic legislators were also concerned. 40 The reactions of Indiana
union leaders perhaps best captured the workers' mood in the wake of the Order.
Francis "Fuzz" LeMay, president of Unity Team Local 9212, stated plainly, "There's
nobody who will speak up for state employees now."' 141 David Warrick, executive
director of AFSCME Local 62, "seemed shell-shocked by the sudden executive
135. Reflecting upon President Eisenhower's admonition that "big decisions should be made
in the calm," Daniels stated, "I don't think he meant sit around and dither for weeks."
Schneider, supra note 118. House Minority Leader B. Patrick Bauer commented on Daniels'
decision-making approach: "He tells you what he thinks, and sometimes he tells you before he
thinks." Id. "One of Daniels' pet phrases is 'seek forgiveness, not permission.' .. . 'If we make
mistakes, let's make mistakes of action."' Id. When confronted with the prospect of union
protests in the wake of his Order, Daniels responded, "If it happens, it happens." Stinson, supra
note 133.
136. Corcoran & Schneider, supra note 110. According to the head of FSSA, Mitch Roob,
the newly restructured state government would be fashioned according to Daniels' will alone.
"'The vision is completely his vision.... [My job is] very easy for me. I ask, 'What would
Mitch Daniels do?' and try to answer that."' Schneider, supra note 118. When Daniels asked
business leaders to serve on the newly created Indiana Economic Development Corporation
(IEDC), he "insisted on being chairman of the group." Smith, supra note 121.
137. Corcoran & Schneider, supra note 110.
138. Id.
139. James Patterson, State Workers Ready to Fight to Keep Their Unions, IND. STAR, Feb.
5, 2005, at A10. According to caseworker Diana Joslin, "the cancellation of the bargaining
agreement wipe[d] away years of efforts to improve conditions for social workers and children
in the state's care. 'Why would we be happy about [the cancellation of] something that we were
voluntarily choosing to be a part of'?"' Id. (alteration in original). State Library employee Irene
Hansen saw the Order as "a horrible idea .... 'The union is the only safeguard against
management taking advantage of employees. This turns back the clock for Indiana."' Corcoran
& Schneider, supra note 110.
140. Representative Greg Porter, the leader of the Black Legislative Caucus, responded,
"Daniels has spoken long and loud about supporting those hard-working state employees who
dedicate their lives to helping the people of Indiana, but now it appears that he does not support
their efforts to earn a decent wage." Corcoran & Schneider, supra note 110. House Minority
Leader, B. Patrick Bauer, claimed the "rescission harmed state employees and their families."
Jim Stinson, Dems and Unions Say Bargaining Ban Risky, MERRILLVILLE POST-TRm., Jan. 13,
2005, at Al.
141. Corcoran & Schneider, supra note 110. These concerns were echoed by Ruby James,
president of AFSCME Local 3146, who felt "Daniels had made too hasty of a decision ....
'The problem is the state has been taking advantage of [employees]."' Stinson, supra note 133
(alteration in original).
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order," 142 and had "no doubt in [his] mind this [wa]s about busting the unions."' 143
Although Warrick predicted that "The union is not gone,"' 44 LeMay was "telling
employees the union's over." 145 The better prediction would have fallen somewhere in
between the two.
2. The Aftermath of the Executive Order
While state employees still retained the right to belong to a union, the lack of
collective bargaining rights rendered the unions toothless. 146 In fact, several unions
almost immediately disbanded.147 With unions effectively sidelined, the new
administration did not wait long to exercise its unilateral power. The most significant
early changes affecting state workers came in the following four areas: employee leave
time; privatization of state functions; departmental restructuring; and employee pay.
Governor Daniels appointed Debra Minott to head the Indiana State Personnel
Department (SPD). His goal was that she "transform the executive branch of state
government into an energized, high-performance organization.' '148 State employees
began to feel the effects of this transformation when Minott unilaterally changed SPD's
policy regarding leave time.
In August of 2005, Minott "cracked down" on what she saw as abuses of then-
existing policies. 49 Her changes significantly limited employee access to family
medical leave and other paid leave time.'5" In a more drastic move, she "eliminated
142. Stinson, supra note 133.
143. Holladay, supra note 134.
144. Kelly, supra note 127 ("'We were here before Bayh signed the order,' he said.
'Obviously this is a setback, but we're still here."').
145. Id.
146. According to Keith McGill, president of lUPA Local 1041, there was no use for his
union in the absence of collective bargaining rights, because, "[q]uite frankly, how many people
are going to want to pay for something they're not getting that much out of?" Corcoran &
Schneider, supra note 110.
147. Board Votes to Dissolve State Police Union, IND. STAR, Jan. 18, 2005, at B02. Less
than one week after Governor Daniels signed the Order, the executive board of UPA Local
1041 "voted unanimously to dissolve the union." Id. In a similar move, LeMay said that Unity
Team Local 9212 would "close up shop and about 10 union representatives [would] go back to
their regular state jobs." Corcoran & Schneider, supra note 110.
148. Ind. State Pers. Dep't, Training Plan for Fiscal Year 2008, available at
http://www.in.gov/spd/files/training_plan.pdf (The mission of SPD is "[t]o support the
Governor... in meeting [his] goals and objectives by proactively providing integrated human
resource services").
149. Niki Kelly, State Workers' Leave Time Pinched, Limits Placed on Family Medical,
Funeral, Vacation, J.-GAZETrE (Fort Wayne), Aug. 26, 2005, at 1C.
150. See id. Under previous agreements, state employees were eligible for the following
benefits: they were entitled to "family medical leave as soon as they were hired"; they "had to
use only up to 10 of their earned sick days" before using family medical leave; and, they were
allowed paid leave to attend a family funeral or when road conditions were bad, Id. Under
Minott's new policies, employees would not be eligible for family medical leave until they had
accrued "12 months' employment with at least 1,250 hours worked." Id. They would be
"required to use all of their available sick leave concurrently" with family medical leave. Id.
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progressive discipline, giving agency heads more flexibility to fire an employee
without going through the steps such as letters of reprimand and suspensions.' '
51
Minott said she understood many employees would not "like the new changes," but
stressed that SPD's officials were "stewards of the state's resources and... need to use
these resources for the benefit of the state."' 52 This rationale seemed to deny the
possibility that providing reasonable benefits to the state's employees couldbenefit the
state-either in the prevention of labor strife or in the pursuit of an economically stable
working class.
Governor Daniels also viewed privatization of state functions as a necessary step in
achieving greater efficiency and productivity. This approach raised questions
concerning the burdens and dilemmas that come with delegation of state authority and
whether this approach is even a sound economic approach. 153 For state employees,
privatization meant something more important: a loss ofjobs. Workers felt this impact
immediately in the Indiana Department of Correction (IDC) and the FSSA.
Several months after signing Executive Order 05-14, Daniels announced that the
state had "awarded a 10-year, $248 million contract to Philadelphia-based Aramark to
oversee food operations at 30 correctional facilities statewide."' 5 4 The IDC
Commissioner admitted the contract would mean "a projected reduction in manpower,"
but Daniels said any workers who lost their jobs could compete with out-of-state
workers for the Aramark jobs.' 55 Despite the likely drop in wages, benefits, and
working conditions for former state employees, the governor felt that competition
based on "local market factors" would be good for the state. 5 6 IDC soon announced
another deal, under which prison nursing would be privatized to a St. Louis
company.157 The fact that IDC employees were still represented by AFSCME revealed
the irrelevance of Indiana's public-sector unions in the post-collective-bargaining
era.
158
They would not be paid to attend the funeral of "greats" (e.g. great-grandmothers or great-
grandsons) or some "steps" (e.g. step-children's funerals merited paid leave, but not step-
sister's). Id. They also had to "take an unpaid day or use one of their personal days" if law
enforcement ordered the roads closed. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. See Stephen Goldsmith & Mark E. Schneider, Partnering for Public Value: New
Approaches in Public Employee Labor-Management Relations, 5 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 415,
421 (2003) (arguing that "privatization alone will not reform the public workplace," and that
"[rieformed labor-management relations arise by partnering with labor to pursue competition").
154. Mike Smith, Private Company to Manage Meal Service in State Prisons, EVANSVILLE
COURIER, May 18, 2005, at B5. The move was based on the idea that Aramark, because of the
broad scope of its operations, would be able to bargain for cheaper subcontracting deals than
IDC could, and thereby reduce the average cost per meal. See id.
155. See id.
156. Id. Many of the IDC workers who would be affected were making only $24,000
annually prior to the deal. Untroubled by their plight, Daniels said, "My view is I'm indifferent
to who wins, as long as the taxpayer wins." Id.
157. See Indiana to Privatize Prison Nursing Services, MERRILLVILLE POsT-TRIB., Aug. 6,
2005, at A9 (The contract was seen as "continu(ing] the trend toward privatization in the agency
under ... Gov. Mitch Daniels.").
158. In response to the deal, an AFSCME spokesman said, "This is just another example of
the governor walking away from state employees." Id. This point is underscored by the fact that
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In 2006, FSSA entered into a $1 billion contract with IBM and Affiliated Computer
Services to process "applications for Medicaid, food stamps and other public safety net
benefits received by about 1.1 million children, seniors, people with disabilities and
other needy Hoosiers." 159 The scheme was similar to that employed by IDC; "a private
consortium [was] being paid... to handle initial intake functions formerly done by
state workers."' 60 Aside from the questionable economic gains and the deterioration in
essential services, many state workers lost their jobs in this deal. 16 1
Governor Daniels candidly acknowledged that his decision to rescind bargaining
rights "would make it easier to fire some employees." 162 On the day he signed the
Order, his press secretary said the rescission of collective bargaining rights would
"make performance pay and employee transfers easier."' 163 One of the administrations'
first major restructuring efforts showed that employee transfers were going to be
offered on a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis.
The Indiana Department of Workforce Development (IDWD) implemented a "cost-
driven consolidation plan" in 2005 that would move all of its 120 unemployment
claims deputies-who were employed throughout the state-to Indianapolis.'
64
According to IDWD Deputy Commissioner Sarah Steele, the affected employees could
"either relocate or they w[ould] be laid off. ' 165 Steele predicted, "about 50 will choose
not to move to Indianapolis."', 66 Notably, the claims deputies were still represented by
AFSCME Council 62.167
In December 2008 Governor Daniels sent a letter to his "fellow state employees,"1
68
notifying them that 2009 would bring "[n]o pay raises for state employees [and] [flew,
if any, new hires." 169 Daniels justified the pay freeze by offering an alternative plan to
give out bonuses "to reward exceptional performers." 70 Addressing potential concerns
both of IDC's privatization deals gave many jobs to out-of-state workers.
159. Tim Evans, Privatization Efforts Targeted, IND. STAR, Aug. 21, 2008, at BO.
160. Id.
161. Id. FSSA Secretary Roob "admitted... that we're not seeing any cost savings," and the
project "spurred myriad complaints about bad service from advocates for the poor, elderly and
disabled." Id.
162. Stinson, supra note 133.
163. Id. ("'Let me just say that I think it will be a lot harder, for instance, for an employee
who has [sic] found to have failed multiple drug tests to get back on a snow plow,' [Daniels]
said.").
164. Unemployment Layoffs Planned, J.-GAzErE (Fort Wayne), May 21, 2005, at 3C.
IDWD "prides itself" on this sort of innovation, "which challenge[s] the status quo." Ind. Dep't
of Workforce Dev., Mission, Priorities, and Shared Values, http://www.in.gov/dwd/2365.htm.
165. Unemployment Layoffs Planned, supra note 164.
166. Id,
167. Seeid.
168. Daniels's Letter, supra note 2.
169. Schneider, supra note 4.
170. Schneider, supra note 3. In his letter, Daniels explained, "all employees who do a good
job deserve more than they are earning today, and top performers much more, and we are
headed in that direction in our approach to compensation ... so that outstanding work will be
amply rewarded." Daniels's Letter, supra note 2. After granting pay raises of two percent to all
state employees in his first three years in office, 2008 saw the first good-worker/bad-worker
distinction: most received a 4.5 percent raise, but some received a ten percent raise. Schneider,
supra note 4.
(Vol. 85:701
HEEDING "THE BEST OF PROPHETS"
of employees deemed unexceptional by the administration, Daniels noted, "[t]hese are
only the first and hardly the last of the hard decisions that will need to be made."'' He
further warned, "the trimmed-down 2009 budget [would] be the base for the 2010 and
2011 budgets .. 172 To soften the blow, he concluded his letter in a tone of
appreciation: "(t]hanks in large part to your work over the past four years, Indiana is in
better shape than most .... Best regards, Mitch."'
73
F. Recent Efforts in the Indiana General Assembly
In response to the governor's rescission of collective bargaining rights, Democratic
legislators tried to remedy the situation through legislation. Each attempt, however, met
with the same fate as proposed legislation from earlier in the decade. 74 Not one bill
made it to the Governor's desk-though it is doubtful Daniels would have signed one
if it had.
The 2006 legislative session included two relevant bills. Representative Clyde
Kersey proposed House Bill 1078, which would have required the state to bargain
collectively with the exclusive representatives of "certain governmental employees and
noncertificated employees of school corporations."' 75 House Minority Leader Bauer
authored a similar proposal. Bauer's House Bill 1372 included the possibility for state
elected officers "to opt in to collective bargaining for the officer's employees."', 76 Both
bills died in the House Labor and Employment Committee.'
77
The 2006 November elections saw the resurgence of the Democratic Party
nationwide. Indiana did not miss out on this shift in power. While Republicans
maintained control of the State Senate, Democrats regained the State General
Assembly by a slim majority of 51 to 49178
Indiana's Democratic legislators used this position to renew the fight for public
workers' collective bargaining rights. In 2007 Representative Kersey authored another
bill-House Bill 1088-that would have established collective bargaining rights for
most state employees. 7 9 The bill made it out of committee and passed the House, both
171. Schneider, supra note 3.
172. Id.
173. Daniels's Letter, supra note 2.
174. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
175. H.R. 1078, 114th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2006) Kersey's bill also would have
established the Public Employees Relations Board (PERB) to administer procedures for
selecting bargaining representatives and adjudicating disputes, and would have limited strikes
by some employees. See id.
176. H.R. 1372, 114th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2006). Bauer's bill also would have
reinstated the bargaining unit assignments, the exclusive bargaining representatives, and the
agreements that were rescinded by Executive Order 05-14. See id.
177. See H.R. 1078, 114th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2006) (Action List); H.R. 1372,
114th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2006) (Action List). Since Republicans controlled the
General Assembly and thus each House committee in 2006, this was not a surprising result.
178. Daniels Seeks Dems Cooperation--Or Not; Governor Extends Olive Branch, Drops It
for Welfare Privatization, IND. STAR, Dec. 3, 2006, at B3.
179. H.R. 1088, 115th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2007). Arguing for the necessity of
his bill, Kersey reminded the public that Indiana "had 16 years of collective bargaining with
state employees, and it worked very well." Mary Beth Schneider, State Workers' Rights Get
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by party-line votes.180 This led House Democrats to claim a victory, asserting that the
bill would "give[] public employees a voice in government."'8s Others rightly viewed
the short-lived success as merely symbolic.182 Upon being sent over to the Senate, the
bill was referred to committee and never heard from again.183 Perhaps anticipating this
result, several House Democrats took a less ambitious legislative approach.' 84 Each
proposed bill met a fate similar to that of Kersey's House Bill 1088.15 In 2008
Representative Kersey tried one more time.186 His public employees collective
bargaining bill fared even worse this time. Whether public employees and their unions
lacked the political muscle or whether legislators lacked the will to support another
symbolic "goodwill gesture ' 87 was irrelevant. The bill never even made it to the
House floor for a vote.1
88
Boost, IND. STAR, Jan. 26, 2007, at B05. In a show of public worker solidarity, the Indiana State
Teachers Association (ISTA) and the Indiana Federation of Teachers (IFT)--whose members
already enjoyed statutory collective bargaining rights-supported the bill. The unions stated
publicly, "school bus drivers, custodians, teaching assistants and others are crucial employees
and should have the right to be protected from being fired at will." Id.
180. See H.R. 1088, 115th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2007) (Committee Vote). "The
fact the bill got a hearing... is a direct result of the November election .... If Republicans had
remained in charge, the bill never would have gotten this far." Schneider, supra note 179. After
a second and third reading and debate on the House floor, the bill passed the House by a vote of
51 to 49. H.R. 1088, 115th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2007) (Action List).
181. Mike Smith, Some Bills That Clear House Likely to Die in Senate, EVANSVnLLE
COUjER & PRESS, Feb. 13, 2007, at B9.
182. According to the Evansville Courier and Press, "passing the bill likely will amount to
nothing more than a goodwill gesture to labor unions that back the party," and the bill "likely
will be dead on arrival in the Republican-ruled Senate." Id. (observing that "[m]ost Republicans
are not big fans of union powers, and the GOP-ruled Senate isn't about to buck their party's
governor on this issue").
183. See H.R. 1088, 115th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2007) (Action List) (the bill
died in the Senate Committee on Pensions and Labor).
184. Representative Dennis Tyler authored House Bill 1133, which would have extended
collective bargaining rights for police officers and firefighters at the "county, city, town, or
township" level. H.R. 1133, 115th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2007). Representatives
Scott Pelath and Peggy Welch authored bills that aimed directly at the terms and conditions of
employment for state employees-matters that would previously have been bargained for by
employees' unions. See H.R. 1203, 115th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2007) (altering the
state employee complaint procedure in a way that limited the discretion of employee supervisors
and SEAC); H.R. 1737, 115th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2007) (requiring the state to
"provide for reasonable" accommodations for breast-feeding mothers in the workplace).
185. Representative Tyler's bill never made it out of committee (perhaps because its
coverage would have conflicted with that of House Bill 1088). See H.R. 1133, 115th Gen.
Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2007) (Action List). Representative Pelath's bill made it through
the House by an overwhelming vote of ninety to eight but died in the Senate's Pensions and
Labor Committee. See H.R. 1203, 115th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2007) (Action List).
Representative Welch's bill never made it out of the House Labor and Employment Committee.
See H.R. 1737, 115th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2007) (Action List).
186. See H.R. 1212, 115th Gen. Assem., Ist Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2008).
187. See Smith, supra note 181.
188. H.R. 1212, 115th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2008) (Action List).
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As it stands in 2010, Indiana public employees enjoy the right to organize, s 9 but
this right provides little substantive benefit. Collective bargaining is only possible
when the state voluntarily agrees to it, and the state may generally dictate the scope and
nature of any bargaining that occurs. Workers are also 'limited in exercising their
political and economic influence in the labor market.'90 They have the right to appeal
workplace grievances through SEAC, 191 but their compensation, employment terms,
and working conditions are at the discretion of the governor through SPD. 192 This
vulnerable status of Indiana's state employees demands reform.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM: HOW TO PROMOTE, PROTECT, AND ENFORCE
PUBLIC EMPLOYEE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING RIGHTS IN INDIANA
To effectuate meaningful reform of Indiana's public sector labor law, advocates for
public workers should work for both legislative and political gains. In the short-term,
they should continue fighting for a collective bargaining statute. Their more important
task, though, is to develop an effective, long-term political strategy. This strategy
should try to break free from the partisan battlelines surrounding labor issues in
Indiana by framing public workers' rights as truly in the best interest of the whole
government and the voting public.
A. Short-Term Legislative Goal: Continue Fighting for a Statute
A comprehensive public sector collective bargaining statute should protect state
employees' rights while accommodating the state's managerial and economic interests.
Collective bargaining should be seen not as an end in itself, but as a means of
achieving peaceful labor relations. By promoting stable and predictable labor relations,
189. "No worker or group of workers who have a legal residence in the state of Indiana shall
be denied the right to select his or their bargaining representative in this state, or be denied the
right to organize into a local union or association .... " IND. CODE ANN. § 22-7-1-2 (West
2008). The "State Employee Bill of Rights" also guarantees that "[n]o employee shall be denied
the right to be a member of an organization of employees," IND. CODE ANN. § 4-15-10-3 (West
2002), and that "[n]o employee shall suffer a penalty or the threat of a penalty because he
exercised his rights under this chapter." Id. § 4-15-10-5.
190. Gregory J. Utken, Labor Law: Survey on Recent Developments in Indiana Law, 11 IND.
L. REv. 196, 198 (1978) ("In Indiana, strikes by public employees are illegal."); see also
Anderson Fed'n of Teachers, Local 519 v. Sch. City of Anderson, 251 N.E.2d 15 (Ind. 1969);
Individual Members of the Mishawaka Fire Dep't v. City of Mishawaka, 355 N.E.2d 447 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1976).
191. IND. CODE ANN. § 4-15-1.5-6 (West 2002). SEAC is "authorized and required... to
hear or investigate those appeals from state employees ... and fairly and impartially render
decisions as to the validity of the appeals or lack thereof." Id.
192. See IND. CODE ANN. § 4-15-1.8-7 (West 2002) ("(a) The Department shall ... (1)
Develop personnel policies, methods, procedures, and standards for all state agencies. (2)
Formulate, establish, and administer position classification plans and salary and wage schedules,
all subject to final approval by the governor.... (4) Approve employees for transfer, demotion,
promotion, suspension, layoff, and dismissal. (5) Rate employees' service.... (8) Promulgate
and enforce personnel rules. (9) Make and administer examinations for employment and for
promotions.").
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a state can protect its interest in delivering public services and simultaneously
acknowledge employee rights.193 This legislative approach would also help the state-
as an employer-elicit valuable contributions from employees who have been deprived
of a meaningful voice in the workplace. The resulting bilateral decision-making
process would incentivize the innovation necessary to reform governance in Indiana.
1. A Statute Would Encourage Stable and Predictable Labor Relations
A comprehensive statute would replace confusion and unpredictability with
certainty and consistency. "'[11n the absence of legislation the parties must depend on
ad hoc procedures, with their rights and duties in doubt, the scope of bargaining
uncertain, and no agency to determine bargaining units or conduct elections .... ' This
results in piecemeal development of public sector collective bargaining by judicial
fiat[,]" unilateral decisions, or a patchwork of overlapping statutory requirements.' 9
4
This framework is confusing at best, and allows the existence and shape ofbargaining
to be determined by individual biases ofjudges and governors. 95
A statute is also the most appropriate and effective way to obtain public employees'
collective bargaining rights. Legislatures are better equipped than the other two
branches of government to weigh the competing interests involved.' 96 Legislatures are
also better equipped to fit new bargaining rights within the existing statutory scheme.'
97
Because of the significant rights at stake, "[t]he legislature should not avoid its policy-
making function where there is a demand that policy be made."'' 98
2. A Statute Would Help Unlock the Potential Value of Employee Voice
One compelling reason for reform is that public employees have been deprived of
their voice. "The concept of 'voice' in the employment context refers to the ability of
workers to communicate viewpoints, complaints, and desires to their employers in a
meaningful way. This voice is beneficial in terms of enhancing individual dignity,
employee satisfaction, workplace productivity, and civic responsibility."'' 99 Governor
Daniels claimed to address this demand through SEAC but this measure is
193. See Gregory, supra note 16, at 109.
194. Id. at 114 (quoting Joel Seidman, State Legislation on Collective Bargaining by Public
Employees, 2 LAB. L.J. 13, 21 (1971)).
195. See id.
196. See id. at 107. Legislative action is "far more likely to find acceptance among citizens
with economic, social, and political differences, since, unlike the judiciary, the legislature may
take divergent opinions into account as part of its law-making function." Id.
197. See Befort, supra note 9, at 1245.
198. Gregory, supra note 16, at 115-16; see also Befort, supra note 9, at 1250 ("The
legislature is not merely an employing entity like a private company or even a public school
board. It is charged with the constitutional responsibility of protecting the public interest
through the enactment of legislation and must retain the capability of responding to fiscal
emergencies.").
199. Stephen F. Befort, A New Voicefor the Workplace: A Proposalforan American Works
Councils Act, 69 Mo. L. REv. 607, 609 (2004).
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insufficient. 200 Statutory collective bargaining rights would liberate public employees
from the unilateral-and potentially arbitrary-power of the executive to dictate the
terms and conditions of their employment.
These rights would also further the state's goals regarding worker productivity and
economic efficiency. "On the enterprise level, employee participation purportedly
enhances an employee's sense of efficacy over his or her work environment. This
democratic empowerment serves basic notions of human dignity and autonomy.
2 °1
While critics may argue that dignity and autonomy are lofty ideals that fail to address
realistic budgetary and personnel concerns, research has disproved this claim. Private-
sector studies have found that "employee involvement generally enhances the
economic productivity of the firm." 20 2 Meaningful voice can also lead to improved
delivery of government services,2 °3 as well as higher employee retention.
204
3. Bilateral Decision Making Would Incentivize Innovation
The bilateral structure of public-sector collective bargaining is also in the best
interest of the state. Assuming that restructuring based upon market-based competition
is needed to revitalize state government, excluding unions from this process-
depriving state employees of participation in necessary reforms-will set the stage for
failure. A unilateral approach to state labor law reform may possess theoretical value,
but it produces questionable results in practice.
Critics may argue that state officials need to respond quickly and aggressively to
financial and political pressures, and that the unique nature of public employment
provides adequate safeguards to protect employees' interests in the absence of
collective bargaining rights. They emphasize the four following points: (1) workers
"can influence management through the electoral process"; (2) workers "are assured
that their employers will not move"; (3) workers "cannot be dismissed without due
200. See supra note 126; supra note 192 and accompanying text.
201. Befort, supra note 199, at 612.
202. Id. at 611-12 ("[E]mployee participation fosters an increased flow of information in the
workplace. This information aids in better problem solving and in the creative design of
workplace systems. This improved information flow also may facilitate better coordination
among production functions.... [Also,] employee participation boosts employee motivation to
perform well at work. By having a say in workplace decisions, employees are more likely to buy
into the firm's processes and objectives. In short, a worker who perceives herself as valued is
more likely to be a productive worker."); see also RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, WHAT
WORKERS WANT 16, 103-05 (1999); DAVID I. LEVINE, REINVENTING THE WORKPLACE: How
BusiNEss AND EMPLOYEES CAN BOTH WIN 38, 80-81 (1995); Brian Becker & Barry Gerhard,
The Impact of Human Resource Management on Organizational Performance: Progress and
Prospects, 39 ACAD. MGMT. J. 779 (1996); Casey Ichniowski, Thomas A. Kochan, David
Levine, Craig Olson & George Strauss, What Works at Work: Overview and Assessment, 35
INDUs. REL. 299 (1996).
203. See Daniel E. Ashyk, Public Sector Collective Bargaining in Ohio, 1984-1993. A
Statistical Overview 19 (Ctr. for Labor Research, The Ohio St. Working Paper No. 014, 1995)
("[T]he derivative impact of higher teacher salaries and a lower pupil to teacher ratio achieved
through collective bargaining has enhanced student achievement.").
204. See Jordan, supra note 131 (concerning the comments of AFSCME's collective
bargaining director on the passage of Delaware's 2007 public sector labor relations statute).
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process of law"; and (4) workers "can rely upon the force of statute, rather than
contract, to establish their compensation packages."205
The reality facing Indiana's public workers in 2009, however, undercuts each of
these arguments. First, the electoral check on the executive is meaningless in the short-
term, because Governor Daniels-under whom the SPD dictates terms and conditions
of employment-is prohibited from seeking reelection in 2012.206 Second, while state
jobs may not move to another state, privatization and restructuring efforts have shown
that these jobs can be easily outsourced or moved to other distant locations within the
state.2°7 Third, due process considerations are nearly worthless to a former state
employee whose former job is being performed by private contractors. 20 They will
also not offer much support to employees concerned about the loss of benefits such as
leave time.209 Fourth, arguments about compensation packages seem flimsy in the wake
of Governor Daniels' recent pay freeze.21 0
A bilateral approach can successfully accommodate the interests of employees and
employers. It would allow management to retain significant discretion in the bargaining
process and incentivize innovation in the workplace. For example, "[b]roadly worded
management rights clauses [in collective bargaining statutes] may give public managers
the right to 'maintain the efficiency of government operations,' or insist that
management has no duty to bargain on matters of inherent management policy."211
Even the former Republican mayor of Indianapolis, Stephen Goldsmith, has suggested
a "joint labor-management" approach for unlocking the "untapped" and "substantial"
potential of state and local workers. 212 This untapped potential can be a vital source of
innovation for state government as it continually seeks reform of its own structure and
services.
4. Potential Statutory Language
One helpful source for lawmakers drafting a new statute is the collection of previous
Indiana bills, dating back to 1975.213 Learning from the constitutional invalidation of
PELRA, legislators must ensure that no aspect of the collective bargaining process is
excluded from judicial review.2 14 Since each of these attempts failed to realize statutory
rights for workers, legislators should also look outside Indiana's own experience.
205. Gregory, supra note 16, at 111.
206. See IND. CONST. art. V, § 1.
207. See supra Part II.E.2.
208. See supra Part II.E.2.
209. See supra Part II.E.2.
210. See supra Part II.E.2.
211. Gregory, supra note 16, at 128 (quoting HAw. REv. STAT. § 89-9(d) (Supp. 1971).
212. Goldsmith & Schneider, supra note 153 ("States and municipalities today form the
locus of innovation in American government."). Among his suggestions were the following:
"The foundation of good labor relations is built on taking workers seriously, addressing their
concerns, and treating them as colleagues[;J ... [w]orking collaboratively with union leaders to
enhance internal labor mobility[;] ... [and r]emov[ing] obstacles that prevent labor from
competing successfully." Id. at 422-23.
213. See supra Parts II.B, II.D, lI.F.
214. See Public Employee Labor Relations Act (PELRA) of 1975, IND. CODE §§ 22-6-4-1 to
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One helpful model is the Ohio Public Employee Collective Bargaining Act of
1984.215 Like Indiana, Ohio had "a history of strong unionization in certain sectors of
public employment 216 and a legacy of failed attempts at similar legislation. 17 The Act
"regulates virtually all aspects of labor relations in the public sector in Ohio," and the
"quasi-judicial" State Employment Relations Board (SERB) is responsible for its
implementation.21 s Collective bargaining under the act is "a several tiered process,"
which includes a structured negotiation process overseen by SERB-appointed
mediators, fact finders, and arbitrators.2 19 According to a study by the Center for Labor
Research at The Ohio State University, the affect of the first ten years of the Act on
labor relations was encouraging for both workers and the state government. "Ohio
public employees have voted overwhelmingly to join unions, 220 and "[t]he collective
bargaining process under SERB [was] remarkably stable with very little strike
activity. 22' Services provided by the Ohio government were also markedly improved
in certain areas.222
For Indiana to follow the Ohio approach might be a political gamble, but it could
pay huge dividends for public workers. The comprehensive nature of such a statute-
encompassing all public-sector labor relations-would necessary alter the current
status of Indiana's teachers who already enjoy statutory collective bargaining rights.223
By throwing their lot in with fellow govermment workers, however, teachers could
retain separate representation and contractual status under their current agreements
while simultaneously boosting the political strength of the public workers' cause. The
teachers would also not necessarily risk losing their collective bargaining rights,
because they would retain their current status if the bill were not enacted.
Whatever approach the Indiana legislature takes in drafting a new statute,
lawmakers should develop a statutory structure that not only guarantees bargaining
rights, but also promotes peaceful and productive labor relations. This can best be
accomplished by staying committed to the values of employee voice and innovation in
the public workplace.
-13, invalidated by Ind. Educ. Employment Relations Bd. v. Benton Cmty. Sch. Corp., 365
N.E.2d 752 (Ind. 1977); see also supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
215. OHio REv. CODE ANN. §§ 4117.01-4117.24 (LexisNexis 2007 & Supp. 2009).
216. Ashyk, supra note 203, at 8.
217. See id. at 4 (Lawmakers from both houses of the Ohio legislature introduced bills in
1947, 1967, 1975, and 1977, which met with varying success, ranging from dying in committee
to being vetoed by the Governor.).
218. Id. at 4. Coverage includes "any political subdivision of the state, such as school
districts, universities, state agencies, authorities, and commissions, counties and municipalities."
Id. at 7.
219. Id. at 10.
220. Id. at 8.
221. Id. at 14.
222. See, e.g., id. at 19 ("IT]he derivative impact of higher teacher salaries and a lower pupil
to teacher ratio achieved through collective bargaining has enhanced student achievement.").
223. See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 20-29-1-1 to -9-5 (West 2008).
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B. Long-Term Political Goal: Reframe Public Workers 'Rights as in the Public
Interest
Resurgence of the movement for Indiana's public workers' rights is possible, but
workers must adopt a new political strategy. The public sector labor movement in
Indiana should implement a strategy that is practical, educational, and nonpartisan.
Despite the merit of arguments in favor of a comprehensive public-sector collective
bargaining statute in Indiana, political realities dictate that such legislation may not be
in the cards anytime soon. The 2008 elections strengthened the Democratic Party's
control of the General Assembly but Governor Daniels will serve until 2012. Also, the
Senate is solidly in the hands of the Republican majority and-with scheduled
legislative redistricting in 201 0-likely will be so for many years to come.
These difficulties are compounded by the problems confronting private-sector labor,
which may contribute to unfavorable opinions of unions generally. 224 Professor Dau-
Schmidt argues that, for private-sector collective bargaining to survive, "unions will
need to adopt new strategies to succeed in organizing and representing workers., 225
This is advice worth heeding for public-sector workers, but the struggle lies in shaping
the nature and scope of the strategy.
Lord Byron once wisely stated, "The best of [p]rophets of the future is the
[p]ast., 226 Learning from the successes and failures ofpublic workers who have already
fought this battle would be wise, indeed.
This Note's content is devoted so much to the history of public-sector labor
relations, in part, to help workers chart their future course. "[I]t is important to
understand that the successes of the 1960s and later decades were built on a foundation
laid by previous decades of determined struggle," and that progress was possible due to
"the agency of workers themselves, matched with new political and social
circumstances."22 7 Workers never wavered on their fundamental right to organize and
bargain, and they "became especially adept at lobbying, elections, and other political
strategies., 228 Most importantly, public workers succeeded in the past because they
"frame[d] their demands as being in the public interest, and [sought] broad political
coalitions rather than simply asserting power in the labor market.
' 229
Bare assertion of power leads to divisive partisanship, which will doom future
attempts at progress. The political parties in Indiana have seemingly already taken
sides on the "labor issue," but public employees cannot choose to continue digging
deeper this line in the sand. 30
224. Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, The Changing Face of Collective Representation: The
Future of Collective Bargaining, 82 C-n.-KENT L. REv. 903,918 (2007) ("There currently exists
a vigorous debate within the American labor movement as to how to respond to this problem.
The crux of the debate seems to be whether to commit resources to innovative methods of
organizing and then to rally the new membership to address limitations in the current law, or to
commit resources to politics in hopes of amending the law to facilitate future organizing.").
225. Id. at 922.
226. Byron, supra note 1, at 37.
227. SLATER, supra note 8, at 194.
228. Id. at 200.
229. Id. at 201.
230. Paul C. Weiler, A Principled Reshaping of Labor Law for the Twenty-First Century, 3
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HEEDING "THE BEST OF PROPHETS"
The aim of true labor law-indeed, any law reform-should not be to confer
selected political benefits on the constituencies that happened to support the
governing party in the last election. Instead, reform should reflect systematic
policy analysis of real world problems and principled adoption of appropriate
solutions-no matter who happens to be the winner or loser on a particular item.
This is the only way we can ensure that the government will be fair to the people
who are directly affected by its actions, and not just react to the positions of those
organizations with political clout.
231
A personality-driven approach to politics can also prevent voters from making
decisions based upon policy and principle, and may hurt the union cause in the long-
term. 2 32 It may lead to more "goodwill gestures" from legislators,233 but will fail to
achieve lasting public sector labor law reform. In the end, public employees would still
be without collective bargaining rights.
Utilizing the lessons of history and arguments of policy outlined in this Note,
Indiana workers and their advocates should apply a simple, three-pronged approach.
First, they should inform the public about why publicsector collective bargaining is in
the state's (and the voters') best interest. Second, they should help elected officials of
both parties to realize and appreciate this valuable public interest. Third, they should
engage citizens and policy makers in a productive dialogue aimed at reforming
Indiana's public-sector labor law.
This approach led Wisconsin to pass its landmark statute in 1959. It led Indiana's
Republican governor to sign PELRA in 1975. It may be the only possibility for
legislation in Indiana.
234
CONCLUSION
Indiana's state employees should be granted collective bargaining rights. These
rights should be guaranteed in the form of a comprehensive public-sector labor-
relations statute-similar to the statute enacted in Indiana in 1975 and those currently
existing in other states. Granting these rights to state workers would establish a
framework for peaceful labor relations that promotes workplace innovation and reaps
the benefits of employee voice. Thus, collective bargaining can be an invaluable asset
U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 177, 179 (2001). ("The fact that labor law reform... has.., been so
partisan and logjam-generating has created another institutional flaw" in the accepted path to
progress).
231. Id. at 178 (emphasis in original). Another possible "by-product" of inducing "American
employee-citizens to focus their attention on whom they want to support in political campaigns
is that it would also induce politicians (and workers) to focus their attention on the needs and
options for improving the situation of ordinary workers on the job." Id. at 183.
232. Leading into the 2006 elections, Indiana Democratic Party Chairman Dan Parker said,
"the biggest issue firing up Democrats is Mitch Daniels himself. 'I think it's been his governing
style .... He has this arrogance about him that he knows best, and he doesn't care about other
opinions out there."' Mike Smith, Daniels Isn't on the Ballot, But He's Focus for Democrats,
MERRILLVILLE POST-TRIB., June 6, 2006, at B3. A revealing fact about this diversionary strategy
was that Daniels was not even on the ballot.
233. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 181.
234. See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 224, at 904 ("Even with the Democrats' [2006] electoral
gains in Congress and the states, the prospects for labor's legislative agenda seem dim.").
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to a smoothly functioning state government and need not unduly hamper managerial
discretion or executive efficiency.
To accomplish this goal, public employees should learn from past progress and
setbacks. Drawing upon the experience of earlier workers struggling for their rights,
Indiana's public employees should chart a new course for this struggle. They should
entertain new approaches to their role in the public workplace. They must craft new
political tactics and begin a new public dialogue. Until workers can convince Hoosiers
of both parties that collective bargaining is in the state's best interest, political
discourse will be burdened by antiquated theoretical obstacles, Indiana's elected
officials will remain mired in the stagnated politics of labor, and Indiana's public
employees will still be working without collective bargaining rights.
